

DRAFT
9 May 1980

NOTE FOR: Chairman, DCI Security Committee

FROM:
Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: NSC Special Coordination Committee Counterintelligence
Working Group - Personnel Security Study

1. You recall that the SECOM staff was tasked 5 February by SCC/CIWG to study investigation problems and make recommendations by 15 June 1980.

2. I gave the task to . The first submission was available the week of 5 May. I read it and think it needs more work. It was redone once but there is still much to do including some pretty basic decisions on how we should play this. You should get involved at least by tasking DD/PSI to review, revise and prepare in keeping with your own policy decisions. I just don't have anyone here to do it. I think that someone should help Dick (if he takes this job with him).

3. One way or the other, our deadline is 15 June 1980 at which time you can expect a call to go before the SCC/CIWG to explain the proposal.



STAT

Notes on Paper

Page 9 Para 2

EO 12065 defines special access programs but it permits heads of departments to create them.

DCID 1/14 does not control or prescribe minimum personnel standards for any special access program except National Foreign Intelligence materials clearly identified by the DCI as being SCI. This will have to be corrected.

Page 9 Para 3

Poorly worded and should be changed. The "worth" has not been proven by the SECOM Survey. DCID 1/14 investigation procedures were examined.

Page 9 Para 4, last sentence

I find it confusing. Does it mean "Analysis of data about different periods of coverage shows that the shorter the period of coverage, the greater the loss of significant data"? If so lets say it.

Proposed New E.O.

Page 2 Section 3 2nd para

Why doesn't the order apply to the Director of Central Intelligence or members of the IC?

Aren't we creating trouble when we say that the DCI shall prescribe standards for access to sensitive compartmented

information? There are hundreds of SCI programs outside of CIA and more outside the IC. The DCI can only prescribe standards for special access programs associated with intelligence sources and methods and then only in accordance with the provisions of E.O. 12065.

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Personnel Security Study

FROM	EXTENSION	NO.
DD/P&M 4E-60 Hqs.		13 MAY 1980

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Personnel Security Study

FROM:

C/PPG
4E70 Hqs

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1 to 2:

Attached herewith is the review you requested on the SECOM Personnel Security Study. I have not analyzed the report in detail, but it looks like a lot of solid research by [] on the issue of investigative standards, and it establishes ideal goals. It does seem to me, however, that we are out of touch with reality to expect field investigations, limited though they may be, for Secret clearances. The U.S. Government went with NAC's when we had solid resources, and I can't think there is a ghost of a chance for expanded coverage in a depression area.

2-3 I agree w/ PPG recommendations. (I note that we don't mention reinvestigations and bring-up-t-dates but I see no point in adding to the resource burden at this time. Also, I don't see why we say "three to five years" as the SECRET level rather than picking one or the other, but no great problem.)